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ABSTRACT 
 
 
We investigate whether timing of the elections leads to riots or not within India. In other 
words, does timing of elections instigate riots? The theoretical underpinning is that an 
incumbent government and opposition parties exercises control over their agents to 
instigate communal mob violence and riots during the election years. The motto behind 
instigating riots is that it leads to polarization of voters and thus benefits the respective 
constituents (incumbent government & opposition parties). Using time series cross-
sectional data for 16 major Indian states for the period 1958 – 2004, we find that 
scheduled elections are associated with increase in riots. Also intensity of riots, proxied 
by rate of growth rate of riots increases in scheduled election years. We also find that 
riots and intensity of riots are responsive to the propinquity to an election year. Meaning, 
as incumbent government nears the elections, riots and intensity of riots keeps increasing, 
while this is exactly opposite during the early years of incumbent government in office. 
These results suggest that elections generate “riots cycle” in regionally, ethnically, 
culturally and socially diverse country like India.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In electoral competition framework, there are different models which deal with the effect 
of elections on government behavior. The first such model, ‘political business cycle’ was 
formulated by Nordhuas (1975), Lindbeck (1976) and Tufte (1978). They argue that 
politicians manipulate the economic policies during the election period, by increasing the 
spending to boost economic growth on one hand and on the other hand, the incumbent 
government aims to keep the unemployment under control, leading to business cycles. 
While, Rogoff & Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) advocates ‘budget cycles’ by 
increasing the spending on consumption and reducing taxes before the elections to 
highlight that the incumbent is competent enough to deliver public services. Recently, 
Khemani (2004) developed the ‘career concern’ model in which she argues that pressure 
of elections will be higher on politicians to provide better public services and increase 
developmental spending and reduce non-development expenditure, highlighting that 
fiscal manipulation would be low and selective only on some of the taxes and spendings 
which directly effect the people. In a new set of studies by Vadlamannati (2008a, b, c) 
find electoral cycles for globalization process for 78 democratic countries and also for 
economic reforms for 26 transition economies. All these studies deal with government 
policies with specific reference to economic policies. However, instead of looking at only 
economic policies, I probe the effect of elections on social issues like political violence. I 
undertake this investigation for two specific reasons: one, assuming that political 
competition between incumbent government and opposition political parties indulge in 
manipulating the social and religious events in instigating mob violence; communal 
violence and riots during the election years to gain political mileage from polarized 
voters. Therefore, one can assume electoral process acts as a derivative in instrumenting 
political violence. Two, it would be interesting to test for the presence of ‘electoral 
cycles’ in riots and its intensity, which largely remains unexplored in the literature.  Thus, 
this study bridges this gap and addresses several questions: Does incumbent government 
and / or opposition parties manipulate the social and religious events to instigate riots just 
before the elections to gain political mileage? Whether there exists ‘electoral riots cycle’? 
Do midterm elections have any impact on instigating riots? And what are the policy 
implications that we can derive from the results?  
 
The main contributions of this paper are as follows.  First, to our knowledge, we are the 
first to demonstrate in a rigorous manner that elections, more specifically scheduled 
elections indeed have a positive effect on the occurrence of riots and its intensity.   
Second, through the use of instrumental electoral cycle for both riots and intensity of 
riots, we show that both of them are responsive to the propinquity to an election year and 
thereby generating ‘electoral riots cycle’. Finally, the existing literature in comparative 
political economy does not document these results for regions within India. 
 
Why India? 
 
I selected India to conduct this study in the first place for several reasons. India happens 
to be world’s second largest developing country with a profound history of stable 
democracy. The Constitution of India allows the elections commission to conduct both   3
union and state legislative elections for every five year term. The state legislative 
elections are conducted for Vidhan Sabha (State assembly) once in five years. The 
participation in union and state elections in world’s second largest democracy is quite 
high. The average turnout in State legislative elections in India is about 62.8% (Election 
Commission, 2004). This apart, the other major reason which makes the selection of 
Indian regions interesting is the subnational variations across the state with respect in 
geopolitical, socioeconomic and macroeconomic factors which play an important role in 
determining the outbreak of riots would be useful in studying the relationship between 
electoral cycles and riots.  
 
Over the decades, riots which take the shape of communal or regional or even political 
have been an integral part of Indian society. The riots have been plaguing the Indian 
society ever since India obtained independence. The graph1 in annexure captures the total 
number of riots in India from 1953 to 2006. These numbers are the sum of number of 
riots occurred in each of the 26 states every year. We find that the number of riots 
significantly increased till 1971. The period from 1971 to 1992 was marked with highest 
number of riots in independent India. However, the interesting finding which emerges 
from this graph is that post 1992 there has been a steady decline in riots. Incidentally this 
coincides with the economic liberalization program which India initiated with the help of 
World Bank in 1991. The growth rate of riots captured in graph 2 also points out this fact 
that post 1992, the rate of growth of increase in riots is infact negative and is declining. 
The period between 1960 and 1985 saw the riots registering highest growth rate.  
 
There is a common consensus amongst researchers, NGOs and general public that riots in 
India are preplanned and well organized and are not instantaneous. Many agree that it is 
the political community which organizes the riots though control over their agents to 
polarize the society before the elections. Brass (2003) shows how political class is 
engaged in organizing and institutionalizing riots in India. While the ruling incumbent 
might engage in precipitating riots before the elections to evade the questions on 
developmental and public services issues, the opposition initiates riots to by exploiting 
the situation of economic insecurity and social unrest amongst the poor to gain political 
mileage from the elections. Therefore, India provides an excellent case study to examine 
the existence of ‘electoral riots cycle’ theory. 
 
2. Election Cycles & Riots: Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
According to the electoral competition theories the opportunistic politicians resort to 
manipulating the economic policies during election years for political gains. Thus, 
country’s long term economic benefits are kept on stake by manipulating the economic 
policies to reduce their short term political losses (avoiding electoral defeats). Infact the 
‘political business cycle’ theory propounded by Nordhaus (1975), Lindbeck (1976) and 
Tufte (1978), the ‘budget cycle’ theory formulated by Rogoff & Sibert (1988) and Rogoff 
(1990) and ‘career concern’ model by Khemani (2004) demonstrate the manipulation of 
incumbent governments to persuade voters just before the election period and thereby 
generate electoral business cycles. These models finds support in the literature specially 
related developing countries (Ames, 1987; Schuknecht, 1996 & 1999; Moyo, 1999; Shi   4
& Svensson, 2000; Block, 2002; Chaudhuri & Dasgupta, 2005 and Vadlamannati, 2008a, 
b, c). However, going beyond economic policies, the effect of elections and electoral 
cycles are evident even amongst social policies like controlling property violence and 
more importantly spurring political violence.  
 
Infact there is vast amount of literature which shows that indeed elections lead to increase 
in political violence specially in developing and under developed economies. The study 
by Chaturvedi (2005) supports our argument that both incumbent government and 
opposition parties resort to violence just before the scheduled elections. In his political 
model, he depicts that political competition between the two parties in the state, one the 
incumbent party with its resources and the second the opposition party through its party 
network foment political unrest. Further, the study by Chaturvedi & Mukherji (2005) 
examining the relationship between violent crimes and elections for 45 democratic 
countries finds significant positive relationship between the two. However, they also find 
that this relationship is highly significant for developing countries, while the same is less 
significant in developed countries. Wantchekon & Ellman (2000) and Wantchekon 
(1999) formulate what is called as ‘strategic voting’ by the voters. They argue that 
strategic and forward looking voters, who take into account the possibility of post-
election unrest, mostly initiated by the political parties, can vote in a pattern that avoids 
the incidence of political violence. Taking the specific case of Indian states, Wilkinson 
(2004) argues that the degree of electoral competition proxied by party fractionalization 
is a key determinant of Hindu-Muslim riots. The findings of his study includes that states 
with higher party fractionalization has lower levels of Hindu-Muslim riots. Similarly, 
Serigenti (2005) finds for Indian states that increase in effective number of political 
parties is associated with lower levels of riots.  
 
But why do incumbent governments and to an extent opposition parties in Indian states 
need political violence to win votes? In its most basic form, proponents of economic 
voting theory argue that voters who are most hurt by the government policies which lead 
to strained economic conditions are more likely to punish the incumbent governments in 
the elections (Burdekin, 1988; Lewis-Beck, 1991; Gleisner, R. F, 1992; Çarko lu, 1997; 
Wilkin et al. 1997; Fielding, 1998 & 2000; Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000; Chappell & 
Veiga, 2000; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000; Youde, 2005; Nordhaus, 2006; Akarca & 
Tansel, 2006a & b; Duch & Stevenson, 2006; Mitchell & Willett, 2006 and Veiga & 
Veiga, 2006). Usually, voters relay more on the macroeconomic conditions of the country 
while voting (Lewis-Beck, 1988), though certain elections are found to be issue based 
elections. But in majority of the cases, it is the economic situation on the ground which 
matters the most and is the driving factor for the voters (Alvarez et al., 2000). It is the 
government policies which actually shape up the socioeconomic conditions of the 
society. Often in developing countries it is observed that the policies initiated by the 
incumbent governments might not lead to inclusive growth. Even in the case of India 
there is substantial evidence to show that economic growth and development process 
resulting from government’s economic policies is not inclusive of the poor (Gupta, 1999 
& Vadlamannati, 2008). This is evident by comparing the growth in GDP and Percapita 
GDP with the pace at which poverty and inequality levels are reduced. On one hand, the 
rate of growth of reduction in poverty and inequality levels has been very low during the   5
last two decades (Dutta, 1991) and on the other hand, India witnessed rapid surge in 
economic growth, industrial and services growth, urbanization and FDI inflows, 
highlighting that the development process tends to be ‘exclusive’. Even the incumbent 
governments are well aware of this ground reality and hence are pressurized to deliver the 
prudent public services to their citizens just before the elections to prove their 
competence. However, failing to achieve these developmental goals in their five year 
tenure, the incumbent governments often resort to instigating mod violence; communal 
violence leading to riots just before the elections. On the other hand, exploiting this 
scenario, the opposition parties through their agents resort to political violence during the 
election years to gain political mileage from the polarized voters. This kind of political 
competition leads to instigating political violence and riots as and when they near the 
scheduled election year. But, the political violence and riots would be come down once 
the incumbent government gets back to the office post elections, thus creating ‘electoral 
riots cycles’. However, this is exactly opposite in the case of midterm elections. This is 
because the timing of midterm elections (which occur anytime after a previous election) 
is unanticipated and hence, it does not provide incumbent government and political 
opposition parties the scope to manipulate the social events and thereby instigate the 
riots.  
 
Taking into account the discussion on riots and electoral cycles, brings us to our first two 
propositions: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Increase in riots and intensity of riots is associated with 
scheduled election years. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Increase in riots and intensity of riots is greater as incumbent 
government nears scheduled election year. 
 
 
Figure 1: ‘Electoral Riots Cycle’ 
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Based on the first two hypotheses, I assume that there is an ‘electoral riots cycle’ which 
basically means riots and intensity of riots are responsive to the propinquity to the 
scheduled election year. Meaning, as incumbent government nears the scheduled 
elections (election year being 0 in figure 1), riots and intensity of riots keeps increasing, 
while this is exactly opposite during the early years of incumbent government in office. 
 
Here it is very important to make a distinction between scheduled elections and midterm 
elections. The scheduled elections are those which are constituted by the Constitution of 
India and occur once in every five years. Whereas, midterm elections are those that occur 
one, two, three or four years after the previous election (either scheduled or midterm), 
that is, before the completion of the full term of the present elected government in office. 
Therefore, this distinction between the two becomes even more important to the choices 
of instigating violence and riots by the political parties because the timing of midterm 
elections is usually sudden and unanticipated. So it is not reasonable to expect incumbent 
governments and political parties to ignite riots and violence to influence election 
outcomes during midterm elections. This leads to our final proposition: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Increase in riots and intensity of riots are NOT associated with 
midterm elections because of its unanticipated and uncertain timing. 
 
Each of these hypotheses is examined in the empirical analysis which would follow this 
section. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3 deals with research 
design with specific focus on measuring riots and intensity of riots, creating instrumental 
electoral cycles for midterm elections and full electoral cycle for distance from scheduled 
election year, followed by data sources and identifying the empirical strategy to be 
employed. Section 4 presents discussion on the results derived from our empirical 
analysis. Final section concludes the study and highlights the implications of the results.  
 
3. Research Design 
 
3. 1. Measuring “Riots & Intensity of Riots”  
 
The dependent variable in our study is riots.  We take into account two distinct forms of 
riots.  One is the number of riots taken place during each year in every state. The event of 
riot is recorded when such incident involves atleast five or more persons. This is the 
recorded value of number of riots in each state from 1958 – 2004
1. Second is the intensity 
of riots. There are many variables which could have been used as proxy, like number of 
deaths; number of arsons; number of participants and so on. However, lack of data on any 
such items for all the 16 states forced us to take into consideration the growth rate of riots 
as best available proxy for intensity of riots
2. This obviously means that higher the rate of 
growth of riots in current year to previous year, greater the intensity of riots. We employ 
                                                 
1 Though the riots data for all the states are recorded from 1954, due to non availability of data on other 
control variables forced us to start our sample period from 1958. 
2 Also, lack of data on certain key macroeconomic and socioeconomic variables forced us to restrict our 
sample of states to only 16. This was done despite having data on number of riots for atleast another eight 
states.   7
data for these variables from annual Series of 1954-2004 original materials published by 
the National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, and Government of India. 
This data was later compiled by Monty G. Marshall and Donna Ramsey Marshall (2005) 
Center for Systemic Peace
3.  
 
3. 2. Constructing Instrumental Electoral Cycles 
 
The need for constructing instrumental electoral cycle arises from the question whether 
timing of elections are endogenous to riots carried by the respective agents of the 
incumbent government or opposition parties.  Theoretically speaking, this may not be 
true because the scheduled elections are fixed on four basis by constitution of India. 
However, over the period of time, especially in the 1980s, we witnessed quite a few 
midterm state legislative elections. These occur due to various reasons which include 
drifting away the members from ruling alliance, political instability because the 
governments sometimes do not possess the required numbers to prove its majority in the 
legislative assemblies, shifting of political alignments within the alliance group and so 
on. Infact in our sample of 16 states for the period 1958 to 2004, out of total 161 state 
legislative elections, 28 happens to be midterm elections and rests are scheduled 
elections. This means over 22% of the total state legislative elections in our sample 
period are marked by midterm elections. The exact timing of these midterm elections is 
sudden and unanticipated. Since these events are unexpected, it may or may not lead to 
instigation of riots, as neither the incumbent government nor the opposition parties would 
have ample time to plan and react to these midterm elections. One possible solution to 
address this problem is to distinguish between the effects of scheduled and midterm 
elections on the outcome of interest – riots and intensity of riots. To this end, I employ 
the technique of Khemani (2004) in constructing what is called as “instrumental electoral 
cycle” which help distinguish the scheduled and midterm elections.  
 
Figure 1: Scheduled election cycle 
      
 
 
 
 
Years 
Note: SE= Scheduled Elections 
 
The typical scheduled election cycle is the one which follows a 4-year cycle and is 
renewed after every schedule election year, that is, it again begins with 4, 3, 2 and 1. The 
figure 1 best captures this cycle. In our models, to capture the scheduled elections effect 
and distinguish with midterm elections, we give the value of 1 for scheduled elections 
year and 0 otherwise. One may note that we do not give the same dummy coding to 
midterm elections here because we capture its effect in separate cycle called ‘midterm 
electoral cycle’.  
 
                                                 
3 The data can be downloaded from: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/ 
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Figure 2: Midterm election cycle 
      
 
 
 
 
Years 
Note: SE= Schedule Elections; MT= Midterm Elections 
 
The midterm election cycle also follows a 4-year cycle, apart from regular scheduled 
elections; it is also renewed after every midterm election. Many times, the scheduled 
elections coincide with election years in midterm election cycle. The midterm election 
years variable is coded as 4, 3, 2, 1 year before a scheduled election year. The year after 
any midterm election is again coded as 4 years before a scheduled election followed by 3, 
2 and 1. The timeline of the midterm election cycle is captured in figure 2. Based on 
these discussions, we formulate the empirical model to estimate the direct effect of the 
scheduled and midterm elections on riots and intensity of riots: 
 
 
 
 
……………………………… (3) 
 
Where: i = country; t = time; δ  = intercept for the equation; ψ = regression coefficients 
for variable “n”; ε = error term for country at time “t”. The dependent variable is R = 
which is number of riots and intensity of occurred in every state in a given year. We log 
the value of riots. The hypothesis variables presented here are: SE = Scheduled Elections 
and Ŧ = 1 for scheduled election years and 0 otherwise; MTC = Midterm election cycle 
and Ŧ = 1, 2, 3 & 4 before scheduled/midterm elections. This means for example: MTC
0
t 
is 1 if t is a scheduled/midterm election year in respective state; MTC
1
t is 1 if t is one 
year before a scheduled/midterm election year; MTC
2
t is 2 if t is two years before a 
scheduled/midterm election year; MTC
3
t  is 3 if t is three years before a 
scheduled/midterm election year and MTC
4
t  is 4 if t is three years before a 
scheduled/midterm election year in the respective states. States in India vary in size, 
political climate and the levels of socioeconomic developmental aspects are different. 
Therefore, the results from above specification (equation 1) might suffer from omitted 
variable bias due to absence of other control variables.  In suspicion that there are other 
factors other than our hypothesis variables affecting riots and its intensity, we estimate 
the same equation by including some observable state characteristics control variables 
(CVt). The description of these variables is given in the next section. This model allows 
to tests key hypotheses mentioned earlier: H1; H2 & H3. Thus, using these control 
variables, equation (3) would therefore be modified as follows: 
 
 
 
……………………………… (2) 
                                        4                                 4 
Rt = δ1 + Σ ψ2 SE
Ŧ
it    + Σ ψ3 MTC
Ŧ
it    + ψ4 Rit-1  +  ε it 
                                                            
Ŧ=1                          Ŧ=1
 
                                      4                                 4 
Rt = α1 +  Σ Ω2 SE
Ŧ
it    + Σ Ω3 MTC
Ŧ
it    + Ω4 CVit  +  ζit 
                                                       
Ŧ=1                           Ŧ=1
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To capture the effects of distance from election years on riots and intensity of riots, we 
developed ‘full electoral cycle’ which is nothing but election cycle year dummies. We 
formulate four dummy variables namely: 4-years before elections variables which take 
the value of 1 in the 4
th year before every scheduled election year and 0 otherwise. The 
second dummy includes 3-years before elections variable which has the value 1 in the 3
rd 
year before every scheduled election year and 0 otherwise. The third dummy variable is 
2-years before elections variable include the value of 1 in the 2
nd year before every 
scheduled election year and 0 otherwise. Finally, 1-year before elections variable takes 
the value of 1 in the 1
st year before every scheduled election year and 0 otherwise. These 
variables measure how the temporal distance from a scheduled election year affects riots 
and intensity of riots vis-à-vis an election year. The model is specified as follows: 
 
 
 
 
……………………………… (3) 
 
Where,  D1, 2, 3, 4…are the distance from scheduled election year dummies. The 
empirical analysis covers 16 regional states from India (see annexure 6) for the period 
1958 to 2006. We use pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) to fixed effects method 
because some of the variables like literate population and religious & linguistic 
fractionalization index are time invariant series. We estimate all models using year 
dummies to estimate any effects of trending data. However, the pooled time-series cross-
sectional data may exhibit Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation problems. While 
these problems do not bias the estimated coefficients as pooled regression analysis in 
itself is a more robust method for large sample consisting of cross section and time series 
data. However, they often tend to cause biased standard errors for coefficients, producing 
invalid statistical inferences (White, 1980). To deal with these problems, we estimated 
for all the models the Huber-White robust standard errors clustered over countries. These 
estimated standard errors are robust to both Heteroskedasticity and to a general type of 
serial correlation within the cross-section unit (Rogers, 1993 and Williams, 2000).  
 
3. 3. Control Variables 
 
We also include analysis of important control variables which determine riots and its 
intensity. To this end, we introduce set of independent variables namely, macroeconomic, 
institutional and political factors. We include these variables in lagged values to control 
for any possible reverse causality effect.  
 
3. 3. i. Socioeconomic factors 
 
a. Economic growth & Development 
 
Economic conditions play a significant role in determining the peace and stability in the 
society. But the relationship between economic growth and development and political 
violence is not clear. According to the modernization theory, economic growth and 
                  4                     4 
Rt = λ1 + Σ β2 SE
Ŧ
t  + Σ β3 MTC
Ŧ
t  + β4 CVt + β5 D1t + β6 D2t  + β7 D3t + β8 D4t + υt 
                     Ŧ=1                        Ŧ=1
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development leads to decline in political violence as development process tends to reduce 
threats and the likelihood of violence is less (Lipset, 1959 & 1994). Also, the findings in 
the conflicts literature show that economic growth reduces the likelihood of conflicts 
(Collier & Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Miguel, Satyanath & Sergenti 2004; Sergenti 2005). This 
was echoed by the study of Rodrik & Subramanian (2004) in the case of Indian states. On 
the other hand, dependency theory claims that economic growth and development would 
most of the times lead to rebellion and thereby instigating violence. This is because if the 
goods in the society are unevenly distributed as disproportionate wealth being generated 
out of rapid economic growth by the rich and elites leads to economic unrest and 
outbreak of violence. The relationship between economic development and state 
repression surely deserves to be tested in the case of Indian states. This is because studies 
like that of Gupta (1999) argue that there is uneven progress and growth within India. 
There is a higher level of economic growth and development in industrial states including 
some of the Western and Southern states, while large numbers of Central, North and 
Eastern states are isolated from the growth story of India. Due to conflicting arguments, 
we make no assumption on the relationship between economic growth and riots, but we 
do believe that economic development process is associated with decline in riots. To 
capture economic growth we include GDP growth rate and logged values of percapita 
GDP in INR millions for economic development process. The data for both these 
variables come from Reserve Bank of India database and the Economic Organization and 
Public Policy Programme (EOPP here after), London School of Economics. 
 
b. Population Pressures 
 
Literature points out the possibility that populous states are more likely to experience 
riots (Sergenti 2005). This is because large levels of population place the pressure on the 
state’s scare natural resources and on governments to deliver the public services. This can 
lead to rebellion amongst people and outbreak of conflicts thereby. We control for a 
state’s population size by including logged value of population in lakhs. The data for this 
variable comes from EOPP. 
 
c. Literacy  
 
Human development is seen as a form of distribution of assets (Perotti 1996; 
Bourguignon 2002). Pioneer studies like Barro (2001) and Lee & Barro (2001) confirm 
the importance of higher schooling levels as the key determinant of development, and 
these findings are confirmed by many other empirical studies. Higher education levels 
reflect the way in which the states invest in human capital. This leads to overall well 
being leading to civil peace in the society. This builds up the argument that the possibility 
that violence in a state is less likely with higher levels of socioeconomic well-being. But, 
in the case of India, the findings are again contradicting as Justino (2004) finds a 
significant negative impact of human development in the form of School enrollment 
associated with number of riots. However, Vadlamannati (2008), Urdal (2008) and 
Sergenti (2005) could not find any significant impact of literacy rates on conflicts risk 
and riots respectively. To account for the possibility of violence eruption in states is less   11
likely with higher levels of educated population, we include the values of literate 
population in lakhs adopted from the dataset generated by Urdal (2008)
4. 
 
d. Poverty 
 
Poor socioeconomic conditions in the form of poverty levels, people living below 1 US$ 
per day, pose serious problems for the governments. The larger percentage of people 
living below poverty line create social discord leading to political instability and risk of 
societal conflict between ‘haves and have nots’. There is a vast amount of literature 
which has shown that persistent poverty levels in the society are responsible for the 
outbreak of riots and civil conflicts. Popular among such studies include Do & Iyer 
(2007) highlighting that conflict intensity is significantly higher in places with greater 
poverty in the provinces of Nepal. Blomberg, Hess & Thacker (2006); Murshed (2007) 
and Justino (2008) argue that higher levels of poverty are detrimental to development 
leading to conflicts. To capture this effect, we include time series data of poverty rates 
obtained for all the states from EOPP webpage. 
 
e. Agriculture Yield 
 
The relationship between agriculture and riots is far from clear in literature. However, 
there are significant findings that agriculture has an impact on outbreak of conflicts. 
Infact it was found that in over 25 cases, agriculture was either directly or indirectly 
instrumental in instigating conflicts (De Soysa & Gleiditisch, 2005). This assumes even 
more importance in the case of India as more than 70% of its population resides in rural 
areas and more than 60% of the population is dependent on agriculture sector. Hence, we 
believe that higher the yield of agriculture crops, greater the civil peace. We include the 
average yield of agriculture crops in each state taken from the dataset of Urdal (2008). 
 
3. 3. ii. Institutional & Political factors 
 
f. Religious & Linguistic fractionalization 
 
The relationship between ethnic composition and outbreak of riots and conflicts is also 
not very clear. Many works in the literature shows that ethnic composition has a 
significant impact on internal conflicts (Hibbs, 1973; Muller & Seligson 1987; 
Lindström, 1996; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Ellingsen, 2000; Sambanis, 2001 and García 
& Marta, 2002). While others could not find any significant affect (Henderson, 2000; 
Fearon & Laitin, 2003). But we strongly believe that there could be significant 
association of religious and linguistic fractionalization with riots in India. With over 28 
states, 29 official languages spoken by more than a million native speakers and nine 
major religions being practiced, it would be imperative to include religious and linguistic 
composition as a key determinant of riots. The data for this time invariant index was 
sourced from the study of Urdal (2008). 
 
 
                                                 
4 I thank Dr. Henrik Urdal, Center for Study for Civil War (CSCW), PRIO for generously sharing the data.   12
g. Rise of Right Wing Political Parties  
 
It is widely believed that instigating riots and conflicts by certain sections of political 
fraternity is a means to protect their political power. The higher electoral competition 
often gives rise to violence (Bawn, 1995). This is true atleast in Indian case as we have 
seen the instances of the incumbent government exercising the control over their agents 
to instigate communal mob violence and riots. We have seen this happening in case of 
Ayodhya, Aligarh in Uttar Pradesh before state elections in 1992, Mumbai Riots before 
1994 state elections in Maharashtra, Godhra riots before 2002 Gujarat elections. There is 
a perception that communal violence and riots are largely associated with the presence of 
extreme right wing ideology political parties in power. In India, the rise of Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP hereafter) as Hindu national party since early 1990s is seen as extreme 
right wing ideology political party
5. While historically the Indian National Congress (INC 
henceforth) which single handedly ruled India for almost over 40 years is widely seen as 
grand secular party of India. Historically, the Muslim, Christian religious minorities and 
other Hindu minorities are comfortable with INC led governments. On the other hand, the 
BJP is known for its ‘Hindu nationalistic ideology’ is traditionally pro-upper caste and 
anti religious minority groups. The INC blames BJP for championing for socio-religious 
cultural values of the country's majority community by instigating communal riots and 
violence against minorities. At the same time, BJP also accuses INC of playing the card 
of minority politics highlighting the role of INC in inciting and participating in anti-Sikh 
riots that killed thousands in 1984. BJP also accuses INC for showing favoritism towards 
appeasing Muslim and Christian communities to consolidate the minority vote bank and 
deliberately fragmenting Hindu community.  
 
Over the years, BJP was largely restricted to North of India as its votes primarily came 
from in Northern and Western India and to an extent from Karnataka in the South. In 
Northern India, BJP captured power in 1991 in the then largest state Uttar Pradesh
6 by 
instigating communal violence. Lal Krishna Advani´s country wide ‘rath yatra’ in 1991 
for the construction of God Ram temple in Ayodhya in the place of Mosque led to 
massive outrage of communal violence which cause many victims. The destruction of 
Babri Mosque in Ayodhya by Hindu activities including BJP workers, Rashtriya Swayam 
Sevak Sangh (RSS hereafter); Vishwa Hindu Parishat (VHP hereafter) and other Hindu 
organizational activists led to social insecurity amongst 140 million Muslim population 
only increasing communal tensions. This had spillover effects on other parts of India as 
many states like Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh 
                                                 
5 The BJP was previously known as Jan Sangh and was formed in 1980 by Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Lal 
Krishna Advani. It is an important member of ‘Sangh Parivar’ (family of a Hindu unit). BJP in its ideology 
is anti western, socialism and Nehuvian Secularism and predominantly aims for building up of ‘Hindu 
Rashtra’ (Empire of Hindus) dominated by upper castes. Over the years it has strongly developed negative 
attitude towards minorities, particularly towards Muslims and Christians. Even in the economic 
development aspect, the idea of development substantially differs from the rest of political fraternity. BJP 
believes in ‘Swadeshi’ policy (economic independence and self reliant policy).  
6 At the moment the present largest state in India is Maharashtra as Utter Pradesh was bifurcated in 2000 
and Uttarakhand was formed.    13
witnessed heavy causalities in communal mob violence between Hindus and Muslims
7. 
Experts like Basu (2001) argue that the success of BJP came from provoking communal 
violence prior to gaining control in some of the biggest states. Wilkinson (2004) also 
believes that the communal card is played by BJP to gain and regain the power. The best 
example perhaps came from Godhra riots in Gujarat in 2002, which was largely done to 
retain the power by BJP. There were large numbers of Muslims deaths recorded during 
those riots, which is termed by the national and international media as one of the worst 
ever riots India has ever seen. Also, ever since the BJP led NDA government was in 
power in center from 1998 – 2004, there were reports of large number of attacks on 
Muslims and Christians particularly in the states of Gujarat and Orissa. Thus, there is 
ample evidence to argue that the rise of BJP and its traditional allies are associated with 
increase in riots. We include simple dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the 
state is ruled by BJP and its allies like Shiv Sena and 0 otherwise. Similarly, we also 
include another dummy variable which codes the value 1 if the BJP led government was 
heading the central government and 0 otherwise. 
 
h. Lagged Dependent Variable 
 
Several studies include a lagged dependent variable to control for autocorrelation which 
satisfies the conditional independence assumptions required for estimation procedures. A 
lagged dependent variable is also meant to control for regional diffusion and spill-over 
effects (Neumayer, 2005). There are two reasons for the inclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable. First, a methodological reason, that is to control for autocorrelation, endogenity, 
and omitted variables (Beck & Katz, 1996). Second, a theoretical reason, that holds that 
there is an influence of past events as a baseline for their present events forming cyclical 
trends. Thus, we include lagged dependent variable for number of riots. However, we do 
not include the same for growth rate of riots and it does not make proper sense for 
theoretical justification.  
 
4. Empirical Results & Estimates 
 
4. 1. Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
 
The sample of state-years that we examine in total make up of 745 observations because 
we do not have seven years data from 1958 to 1964 for Haryana
8. In Annexure 1, we 
present summary statistics for this sample for all the variables that we employ in the 
regression analysis. The mean value for number of log riots is 7.75 per state-year with a 
standard deviation of roughly 1.58. The sample also includes growth rate of riots which 
was taken as proxy for intensity of riots. The mean value for growth rate of riots is 
around 7.02% with minimum value of -80% and maximum growth rate of 1500%. The 
standard deviation is on higher side with 65.24%. Regarding GDP growth rate we can 
find that the median growth rate is 11.60%.  Moreover, the variance in GDP growth rates 
                                                 
7 Many see the Mumbai blasts by terror outfits in 1993 as a response to the demolition carried out by Hindu 
activities of Babri Mosque.   
8 In 1965 Haryana was carved out of Punjab state. Therefore, the Haryana data in our sample starts from 
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is quite high, with a standard deviation of 8.94% and growth rates ranging from –17.60% 
to 57.13%. With respect to percapita GDP, the mean value is log 7.60 with a standard 
deviation of 1.35. The statistics for Poverty rate are frightening and so do for literate 
population. The mean value of the former is 42.83%. While the minimum value is 
11.58%, the maximum value however is 79.89%. Also, the variance across the states is 
quite large with a standard deviation of around 13.57%. We can see that the highest value 
of literate population is around 898 lakhs and the minimum value is just 77 lakhs 
highlighting that the inter-state variations are large. Interms of agricultural yield, the 
median value is around 10% with minimum of 4.55% and maximum value of 40.30%, 
again suggesting significant cross-state variations.   
 
In Annexure 2 we present the detailed information about the growth rate of riots during 
scheduled election years for all the states in our sample for our study period. We see that 
in states like: Andhra Pradesh; Gujarat; Jammu & Kashmir; Karnataka; Kerala; 
Maharashtra; Orissa; Punjab; Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu, there was large number of 
positive growth rate in riots during the scheduled election years. While only in Bihar 
surprisingly, we find that there is a negative growth rate of riots during the scheduled 
election years. In other states like: Assam; Haryana; Madhya Pradesh; Uttar Pradesh and 
West Bengal  we find that four times the growth rate of riots out of eight scheduled 
elections was positive, while rest of the times it was negative. On the whole, taking into 
consideration all these states during the period 1958 – 2004, we find that out of 133 
occasions, 87 times there was positive growth rate in riots while 47 times the growth rate 
was negative. This gives us that fist glimpse that there is certainly some impact of 
scheduled elections on instigating riots. But it is not as comprehensive as we would have 
expected. Based on these values, we then classified these states under three categories. 
These include: number of states with more positives to negative growth rate; number of 
states with more negatives to positive growth rate and even growth rates during the whole 
study period. In total we find that 10 states fall under the first category, while 5 states 
come under last category of even growth rates. Only one state, Bihar is under the second 
category. This also suggests that in majority of the states there is raw evidence of some 
positive relationship between scheduled elections and growth rate of riots. The dummy 
variable construction was done using the information of Elections Commission of India’s 
data on Union and State election results. 
 
4. 2. Regression Estimates 
 
The results of regression estimates in assessing the impact of scheduled, midterm 
elections and electoral cycle on riots and intensity of riots is presented in table 1 and 2. 
We present total eight models (without control variables) in table 1 in which first four 
models (1 to 4) are related to riots, followed by another four models (5 to 8) are related to 
intensity of riots. Similarly, in table 2 we capture the same results but also include some 
of the key determinants of riots as control variables. The four models (9 to 12) capture 
riots, while the last four deals with intensity of riots. Addressing the problems of stability 
of these results, sensitivity analysis is conducted of which the results are displayed in 
annexures. We also control for the problem of Heteroskedasticity using White 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance.    15
The regression results confirm the hypothesis offered for electoral cycles on riots in the 
Indian context. Specifically, the results from the equation 1 show that scheduled elections 
have a significant positive effect on the riots. Concentrating on results of equation 1 
indicates the direct relationship between riots and electoral cycle. The coefficients 
reported in model 1 (see table 1) indicate that the presence of scheduled election year is 
leading to increase in riots by 0.08% with 1% statistical significance. We include a 
lagged dependent variable to control for autocorrelation. A lagged dependent variable is 
also meant to control for the spill-over effects (Neumayer, 2005). The results of lagged 
dependent variable show 1% significant and positive relationship. This suggests that there 
is an impact of past events as a baseline for their present events. Using lagged dependent 
variables, we were also able to counter the problem of auto correlation (see the Durbin 
Watson statistic results).  
 
Table 1: Election Cycle; Riots & Intensity of Riots equation function  
 
 
 
Variables 
Model 1 
 
Log (Riots) 
 
Model 2 
 
Log (Riots) 
 
Model 3 
 
Log (Riots) 
 
Model 4 
 
Log (Riots) 
Model 5 
 
Riots 
Growth rate 
Model 6 
 
Riots 
Growth rate 
Model 7 
 
Riots 
Growth rate 
Model 8 
 
Riots 
Growth rate 
 
 
Constant 
0.14 
(0.12) 
0.16 
(0.12) 
0.10  
(0.12) 
0.22 *** 
(0.13) 
7.26 + 
(4.68) 
6.13 
(7.58) 
0.64 
(7.11) 
22.31 * 
(4.64) 
Scheduled Election year 
0.08 * 
(0.02) 
 
------ 
0.11 * 
(0.03) 
 
------ 
6.47 *** 
(4.15) 
 
------ 
10.24 * 
(3.83) 
 
------ 
Mid-term Election year 
 
------ 
0.003 
(0.01) 
0.02 ** 
(0.01) 
 
------ 
 
------ 
0.97 
(1.37) 
2.60 ** 
(1.27) 
 
------ 
1 year before Elections 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
-0.09 * 
(0.03) 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
-19.11 * 
(7.28) 
2 years before Elections  ------  ------  ------ 
-0.12 * 
(0.03)  ------  ------  ------ 
-21.07 * 
(7.15) 
3 years before Elections  ------  ------  ------ 
-0.04 + 
(0.03)  ------  ------  ------ 
-13.54 ** 
(7.04) 
4 years before Elections  ------  ------  ------ 
-0.06 *** 
(0.04)  ------  ------  ------ 
-14.25 ** 
(7.36) 
Log (Riots (t – 1)) 
0.99 * 
(0.02) 
0.99 * 
(0.01) 
0.99 * 
(0.02) 
0.99 * 
(0.02)  ------  ------  ------  ------ 
Time Dummy 
-0.002 ** 
(0.00) 
-0.002 ** 
(0.00) 
-0.002 ** 
(0.00) 
-0.003 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.27) 
-0.05 
(0.27) 
-0.06 
(0.27) 
-0.13 
(0.25) 
 
R-squared  0.969319 0.968964 0.969483 0.969725 0.001594 0.000428 0.003260 0.015927 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.969192 0.968835 0.969314 0.969474 0.001157 0.002326 0.000865 0.009122 
Log likelihood  -100.8475  -105.0467  -98.89748  -95.98920 -4079.175 -4079.601 -4078.566 -4073.904 
F-statistic  7635.15 *  7544.93 *  5750.11 *  3854.41 *  0.579  0.155  0.790  2.34 ** 
Durbin-Watson  stat  2.151648  2.165203  2.168649  2.167646 1.40 1.405149  1.402316  1.411417 
Number of States  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16 
Total No. of Observations  730  730  730  730  730  730  730  730 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level & *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 5% confidence level. All models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.   16
In model 2, we replace scheduled elections years with the midterm election cycle. We 
found that it is not significant, suggesting that midterm elections do not have an impact 
on riots because of the uncertainty of occurrence associated with such elections. In model 
3 however, when we introduced both scheduled and midterm elections, we found that 
both to be positive and statistically significant. The scheduled elections years have both 
higher coefficient and significance values to midterm elections, highlighting that the 
impact of scheduled elections on riots is clear and greater. In models related to intensity 
of riots, we find exactly similar results, but we did not include lagged dependent variable 
as it does not make sense to see if the growth rate in the past effects the current ones. The 
scheduled elections years are associated positively with higher growth rate of riots to its 
previous years. While this is statistically significant at 10% confidence level, we could 
not find any such evidence for midterm elections (see models 5 & 6; table 1). The model 
7 again shows that when introduced together, the impact of scheduled elections on 
growth rate of riots is much higher and significant than that of midterm elections. This 
reconfirms that the impact of scheduled elections are not only associated strongly with 
riots, but also with its intensity.  
 
In models 4 and 8 (in table 1), we introduce full electoral cycles for both riots and its 
intensity. We find that the impact of these variables is negative. This suggests that the 
distance from scheduled elections years are not associated with riots. But when we 
consider the coefficient values of all these four variables (4 years before election years; 3 
years before elections years; 2 years before election years and 1 year before election year) 
for both riots and intensity of riots, we find that they keep increasing as and when they 
near the scheduled election year. We found earlier in model 1 and 5 that in the scheduled 
election years impact on riots and its growth rate is positive. This relationship in a 
graphical format depicts a U-shaped kind of relationship. This is captured in graphs 3 and 
4 in annexures for both riots and intensity of riots respectively. But, these results might 
suffer from possible omitted variable bias. Hence the results should be validated by 
including some of the important socioeconomic, institutional and political variables 
which formulate key determinants of riots.  A step in this direction is the results captured 
from model 9 to 16 in table 2. 
 
Table 2: Election Cycle, Riots & Intensity of Riots equation function 2 
 
 
Variables 
Model 9 
 
Log (Riots) 
 
Model 10 
 
Log (Riots) 
 
Model 11 
 
Log (Riots) 
 
Model 12 
 
Log (Riots) 
 
Model 13 
 
Riots 
Growth rate 
Model 14 
 
Riots 
Growth rate 
Model 15 
 
Riots 
Growth rate 
Model 16 
 
Riots 
Growth rate 
 
 
Constant 
0.47 ** 
(0.23) 
0.51 ** 
(0.23) 
0.43 *** 
(0.22) 
0.49 ** 
(0.22) 
-54.78 
(70.20) 
-54.27 
(73.63) 
-61.92  
(73.06) 
-57.45 
(72.61) 
Scheduled Election year 
0.07 * 
(0.02) 
------  0.10 * 
(0.02) 
------  6.00 *** 
(3.83) 
------  10.03 * 
(3.65) 
------ 
Mid-term Election year 
------  0.003 
(0.00) 
0.02 ** 
(0.00) 
------  ------  1.14 
(1.56) 
2.75 *** 
(1.58) 
------ 
1 year before Elections 
------ ------ ------  -0.09 * 
(0.03) 
------ ------ ------  -18.63 ** 
(7.57) 
2 years before Elections  ------  ------  ------  -0.11 *  ------  ------  ------  -19.68 *   17
(0.03) (6.96) 
3 years before Elections 
------  ------  ------  -0.03 
(0.03) 
------  ------  ------  -12.20 *** 
(6.82) 
4 years before Elections 
------  ------  ------  -0.06 *** 
(0.03) 
------  ------  ------  -12.91 ** 
(6.77) 
GDP Growth rate (t – 1) 
0.002  
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
0.002  
(0.00) 
0.18 
(0.22) 
0.18 
(0.22) 
0.17 
(0.22) 
0.19 
(0.22) 
Log   
(Economic Development (t – 1) 
-0.08 *** 
(0.04) 
-0.09 ** 
(0.04) 
-0.08 *** 
(0.04) 
-0.07 *** 
(0.04) 
14.34 
(12.52) 
14.16 
(12.81) 
14.92 
(12.75) 
17.46 
(13.76) 
Log (Population (t – 1)) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
6.34 ** 
(2.94) 
6.40 ** 
(3.05) 
6.62 ** 
(3.04) 
6.29 ** 
(2.97) 
Fractionalization (t – 1) 
0.007 
(0.01) 
0.007 
(0.01) 
0.007 
(0.01) 
0.007 
(0.01) 
3.03 
(2.87) 
3.00 
(2.88) 
3.02 
(2.86) 
3.05 
(2.90) 
Literate Population (t – 1) 
0.0001 
(9.71E-05) 
0.0001 
(9.71E-05) 
0.0001 
(9.73E-05) 
0.0001 
(9.89E-05) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
Poverty rate (t – 1) 
0.002 *** 
(0.00) 
0.002 *** 
(0.00) 
0.002 *** 
(0.00) 
0.002 *** 
(0.00) 
0.66 ** 
(0.33) 
0.65 ** 
(0.33) 
0.66 ** 
(0.33) 
0.66 ** 
(0.33) 
Agriculture Yield (t – 1) 
-0.003 
(0.00) 
-0.003 
(0.00) 
-0.003 
(0.00) 
-0.003 
(0.00) 
1.94 
(1.63) 
1.93 
(1.63) 
1.94 
(1.63) 
1.86 
(1.61) 
BJP Government at Center 
0.06 ** 
(0.02) 
0.07 ** 
(0.02) 
0.06 ** 
(0.02) 
0.05 *** 
(0.02) 
10.94 ** 
(5.26) 
11.59 ** 
(5.22) 
10.64 ** 
(5.19) 
7.65 *** 
(4.48) 
BJP Government at States 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
-1.49 
(12.97) 
-1.27 
(13.23) 
-2.24 
(13.30) 
-4.20 
(13.65) 
Log (Riots (t – 1)) 
0.96 * 
(0.02) 
0.96 * 
(0.02) 
0.96 * 
(0.02) 
0.96 * 
(0.02) 
------  ------  ------  ------ 
Time Dummy 
0.006 
(0.00) 
0.007 *** 
(0.00) 
0.006 
(0.00) 
0.005 
(0.00) 
-1.29 + 
(0.87) 
-1.29 + 
(0.89) 
-1.32 + 
(0.89) 
-1.56 *** 
(0.97) 
 
R-squared  0.970170 0.969885 0.970310 0.970518 0.031158  0.030325  0.032998  0.043319 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.969670 0.969380 0.969770 0.969898 0.016295  0.015449  0.016791  0.024560 
Log Likelihood   -90.60142  -94.06245  -88.88156  -86.31551 -4068.219 -4068.532 -4067.526  64.43701 
F-statistic  1940.54 *  1921.63 *  1797.48 *  1564.77 *  2.10 **  2.038 **  2.04 **  2.309 * 
Durbin-Watson  stat  2.146510 2.160069 2.164505 2.157224 1.493944  1.496368  1.494006  1.496868 
Number of States  16  16  16  16  16  16  16  16 
Total  No. of Observations  730  730  730  730  730  730  730  730 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level; *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 5% confidence level. All models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.  
 
The coefficients of scheduled elections reported in models 9 and 13 (see table 2) indicate 
that scheduled election years are strongly associated with increase in riots and intensity of 
riots. We find that for every single scheduled election year, the riots are increased by 
0.07% and the same increase for intensity of riots is around 6%. Infact adding control 
variables did not change the statistical significance level of both the variable. These 
results remain consistent and are robust to the changes introduced in the model. In model 
10 and 14 we replace scheduled election years with midterm electoral cycle. We find that 
though it has positive sign, it remains statistically insignificant, suggesting that midterm   18
elections necessarily always need not result in instigating riots and its intensity because 
of the uncertainty in timing associated with it. 
 
We present full electoral cycle using distance from election year dummies in model 12 
(see table 2). The results show some interesting findings. We find that all the variables, 4, 
3, 2, and 1 year distance from scheduled election year is negative. The coefficient values 
of these variables show some interesting trends. I find that riots would decrease by just -
0.06% during the first year of incumbent government in office. This negative effect is -
0.03% during the second year of incumbent government in office. While, riots would 
decrease by more than -0.09% in the third year of incumbent government in office, it 
increases by -0.02% in the fourth year in office, registering a 1% significant increase in 
riots of -0.09% in the year before a scheduled election. This however, turns positive in 
the election year resulting in increase in riots. The coefficients plotted in graph 5 (see 
annexures) clearly depict a ‘cyclical movement’ in carrying out the riots by the 
incumbent governments. The graph shows almost U-shaped kind of relationship between 
scheduled elections and riots. We also find similar such cyclical relationship between 
electoral cycle and intensity of riots presented in model 16. I find that intensity of riots 
would decrease by just -12.91% during the first year of incumbent government in office. 
This negative effect is -12.20% during the second year of incumbent government in 
office. But intensity of riots would decrease to -19.68% in the third year of incumbent 
government in office and then it increases slightly to -18.63% in the fourth year in office, 
registering a 5% significance level. This relationship turns positive during the actual 
election year. These coefficients are again plotted in graph 6 showing U-shaped 
relationship between the two. These results confirm the three hypothesis, H1; H2 & H3. 
 
Within the control variables, we find that economic growth is neither negative nor 
statistically significant. But, we find that economic development process is negatively 
associated with riots, though its impact on intensity of riots is insignificant. For every 1% 
increase in log percapita GDP is leading to 0.08% decline in number of riots. The 
relationship between riots, economic growth and development are captured in scatter 
chart in graphs 7 and 8 in annexures. One can see that the impact of economic growth on 
riots is nil, while there is marginal negative effect of economic development on riots. 
Surprisingly our results are exactly opposite to that of the findings of Miguel, Satyanath 
& Sergenti (2004) and Sergenti (2005) in Indian context. They found that economic 
growth lead to decline in riots. Moreover, Sergenti (2005) also shows that economic 
development (percapita GDP) does not have any significant effect on riots and bears 
positive sign. However, our arguments are consistent with Gupta (1999) that mere growth 
would not be helpful, but it should translate into higher levels of economic development. 
In other words the growth process within India is not inclusive. This is precisely one of 
the reasons why income inequalities in the states are still at higher levels. There is also 
wide range of economic disparity amongst the states in India. Though the economic 
reforms process have ushered higher levels of economic growth, its benefits are not 
reaching to the poor. The study by Gupta (1999) supports the fact the economic growth 
process in India remains exclusive and has helped only certain sections of the society. 
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Consistent with the findings of Hauge & Ellingsen (2001) and De Soysa (2002) Urdal 
(2005) we find positive link between population levels, riots and intensity of riots. We 
find this relationship to be positive when put on a scatter graph 9 (see annexures). 
Though the results for riots remain insignificant, we find 5% statistical significance for 
intensity of riots and these remain consistent across all the models. The results related to 
religious & linguistic fractionalization and agricultural yield are insignificant throughout. 
Even the signs are mixed across the models. Given the very rate of literacy in most of the 
states in India and more particularly in rural India, we could not find any significant 
relationship with riots. Though the sign for riots is positive, the coefficient values are 
very low. But, we find insignificant negative association with intensity of riots (see table 
2). The results of poverty levels are in line with Boix (2004) and Justnio (2004) who find 
that poverty and inequality often risk conflicts and riots. We find 10% and 5% significant 
positive impact of Poverty levels on riots and intensity of riots respectively. This also 
means that poverty play an important role in instigating violence and this relationship is 
also captured in scatter graph 10 in annexures. 
 
The most interesting findings of the control variables are that of political factors. We find 
that each year presence of BJP led government at center would significantly increase the 
events of riots by 0.06% and intensity of riots by 10.94%. On the contrary, we could not 
find any significant impact of presence of BJP led government at states neither on riots 
nor its intensity. This is probably because till 1998, almost all the states in India were 
ruled with either INC or the respective regional parties. Even though in some states pre-
1998, BJP came to power (like in Uttar Pradesh in 1991 and Rajasthan in 1994) it could 
not last in the government for full term. Also, the lagged dependent variable shows 1% 
significant positive relationship. This suggests that past events are more likely to affect 
the events in the current year. 
 
4. 3. Robustness Check 
 
We ran several tests of sensitivity. First, we ran all the results again by dividing the total 
sample group into two. Each set includes eight states, wherein the first group includes: 
Andhra Pradesh; Karnataka; Kerala; Tamil Nadu; Orissa; West Bengal; Bihar and Assam. 
The second set of sample group includes: Gujarat; Jammu & Kashmir; Maharashtra; 
Punjab; Rajasthan; Haryana; Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. The results for both the 
sample groups show no significant changes in the results which we obtained in baseline 
models earlier.  Second, we also ran the results for all states in sample but this time 
cutting short the study period into two halves, 1958-1980 and 1981-2004. Despite this 
bifurcation, the results largely remained consistent across the board in both the sample 
periods. Third, I convert all the variables from current levels to first differenced variables. 
The results show no major changes from baseline model
9.  
 
Finally, we perform sensitivity tests for our models by replacing both riots and intensity 
of riots with interactive variables with the two dummy variables which take into account 
the value 1 if the BJP is in power in states and 0 otherwise. We interact this dummy 
variable with number of riots. Next, we include another interactive variable which is 
                                                 
9 Due to space constraints, all these results are not shown here. They will be provided on request.    20
assigned the value of 1 if the INC is in power in states and 0 otherwise. Then we interact 
this dummy variable with riots. These variables capture the conditioning effects of 
partisan politics on instigating riots. These results are presented in annexure 4. In models 
17 to 19, riots during BJP government was included while models from 20 to 22 include 
riots during INC government. The results once again reconfirm our earlier finding that 
irrespective of BJP or INC in government, scheduled elections has a significant positive 
impact on riots. We also find that midterm elections do not have any major impact on 
riots. Also, we find that the electoral cycle in both the case depicts cyclical movement on 
riots. The models 19 and 22 show that as the scheduled elections draws nearer, the 
negative effect on riots diminishes. The coefficients of electoral cycle on riots for both 
riots during BJP and INC governments show U-shaped kind of relationship. 
 
5. Conclusion & Summary 
 
Literature on political competition demonstrates how incumbent politicians might 
manipulate economic policies to persuade voters before an election, and thereby generate 
political budget cycles (Nordhuas, 1975; Lindbeck, 1976; Tufte, 1978; Rogoff & Sibert, 
1988; Rogoff, 1990; Khemani 2004). Several studies followed thereafter based on these 
models but are mostly restricted to economic policies. We extend these political business 
cycles models to general social issues like political violence. Using the cross sectional 
time series data for 16 Indian states for the period 1958 – 2004, we examine the impact of 
scheduled elections, midterm elections and electoral cycle on riots and intensity of riots, 
an extreme form of political violence.  
 
We make use of National Crime Bureau of government of India’s data on number of riots 
occurred in each state in every year and compute the rate of growth of riots which is 
taken as proxy for intensity of riots. We then formulate ‘electoral riots cycle’ based on 
the premise that elections are associated with outbreak of riots and reduce considerably 
during the post elections period. Because the economic policies adopted by the 
governments tend to be exclusive of the poor and benefits only some sections of the 
society, the incumbent governments are pressurized before the elections to counter the 
anti incumbency factor. Thus, the incumbent governments resort to political violence 
during then election years. One the other hand, the opposition parties often to gain 
political mileage during the election years are engaged in instigating political violence to 
influence the voters. Thus, both the incumbent government and opposition parties 
exercise control over their agents to instigate violence as and when they near the 
scheduled election years. The motto behind instigating riots is that it leads to polarization 
of voters and thus benefits the respective constituents (incumbent government & 
opposition parties). Based on this theory, we offered and tested three related hypotheses 
on electoral cycle related to riots and intensity of riots.  
 
We demonstrate through our findings that scheduled elections are very strongly 
associated with increase in number of riots and intensity of riots. While there is a strong 
electoral cycle in riots and intensity of riots, which experiences a marked increase in 
election years, the impact of midterm elections is found to be insignificant on both. This 
is perhaps due to its timing which is uncertain and unanticipated which gives no scope of   21
the incumbent governments and opposition parties to act swiftly in polarizing a particular 
event or an issue. The results portrayed in the paper are strongly valid as we have 
nullified the problems of stability, serial correlation and endogenity concerns. We also 
addressed the issue of how sensitive the results are. To this end, we used dynamic pooled 
OLS with interactive variables as dependent variables viz., occurrence of riots during the 
tenure of BJP in government and INC in power. The results do not change replacing the 
original dependent variables with the new ones. Thus, an incumbent’s varying degree of 
concern for instigating riots and intensify the riots for its short term political gains and 
fear against loosing the elections increases as the national elections draw nearer - does 
seem to be a plausible hypothesis within India, and is well supported by the results in this 
paper. This is best exemplified by the estimated instrumental electoral cycle for our both 
dependent variables wherein both riots and intensity of riots tend to decrease during the 
earlier years of an incumbent’s tenure in office, and increase as the scheduled elections 
draws near. Further, the statistically insignificant effect of midterm elections on riots and 
its intensity also provides evidence in favor of the hypotheses offered in this study. These 
findings of our study are not documented in the existing comparative political economy 
literature.  
 
Implications of the results  
 
The results in this paper highlight three important points. First, these results show that 
electoral cycles are not necessarily confined to economic policies like: reforms; fiscal and 
monetary policies alone. Rather, it can affect the most important social issues like 
political violence including riots and its intensity, which is detrimental to overall progress 
and development of the society. Second, these results also suggest that elections can 
indeed act as a destructive force by creating social unrest and hampering peace and 
harmony in the society. Finally, the effect of political manipulation to gain and regain the 
power through the violent means by the incumbent governments and opposition parties 
shows how politicians are only concerned to maximize their short run political gains at 
the expense of long run economic prosperity and peace. 
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Annexures 
 
 
Annexure 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
Variables   Mean   Median   Maximum   Minimum 
 Standard  
Deviation 
 
Observations 
 Cross  
sections 
 
Scheduled Election Year  0.18 0.00  1.00  0.00  0.38  744  16 
 
1 year before Scheduled elections  0.18 0.00  1.00  0.00  0.38  744  16 
 
2 years before Scheduled elections  0.17 0.00  1.00  0.00  0.38  744  16 
 
3 years before Scheduled elections  0.17 0.00  1.00  0.00  0.37  744  16 
 
4 years before Scheduled elections  0.17  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.37  744  16 
 
Midterm Election Cycle  2.33  2.00  4.00  0.00  1.18  744  16 
 
Log (Riots)  7.75  8.11  9.98  0.00  1.58  744  16 
 
Growth rate of Riots 
 
7.02 1.80  1500  -80 
 
65.24 744  16 
 
GDP growth rate  12.18  11.60  57.13  -17.60  8.94  744  16 
 
Log (Percapita GDP)  7.60 7.51  10.33  5.38  1.35  744  16 
 
Log (Population)  10.42 10.51  12.13  8.18  0.76  744  16 
 
Fractionalization Index  2.89 2.65  4.74  1.86  0.64  744  16 
 
Literate Population  383.51  362 898  77 159.13  744  16 
 
Poverty rate  42.83 43.65  79.89  11.58  13.57  744  16 
 
Agriculture Yield  12.01 10.01  40.30  4.55  6.52  744  16 
 
BJP Government at States  0.10 0.00  1.00  0.00  0.30  744  16 
 
BJP Government at Center  0.24 0.00  1.00  0.00  0.43  744  16 
 
BJP Government at States * Riots  3.37 3.52  4.33  0.00  0.69  744  16 
 
INC Government at States * Riots  0.29 0.00  4.33  0.00  0.94  744  16 
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Annexure 2: Scheduled Election Years & Increase (Decrease) of Riots (1958 – 2004) 
 
States 
No. of Scheduled 
Elections 
No. of times Growth rate 
of Riots was Positive  % share 
No. of times Growth rate 
of Riots was Negative  % share 
 
Andhra Pradesh   9 7  80%  2  20% 
 
Assam  8 4  50%  4  50% 
 
Bihar 8  2  20%  6  80% 
 
Gujarat 8  7 90% 1 10% 
 
Haryana 8  4 50%  4  50% 
 
Jammu & Kashmir  8  7  90%  1  10% 
 
Karnataka 9  8 
 
90%  1 
 
10% 
 
Kerala  9 6 
 
90%  1 
 
10% 
 
Madhya Pradesh  8 4  50%  4  50% 
 
Maharashtra  9 7  90%  1  10% 
 
Orissa  9 6  80%  3  20% 
 
Punjab  8 5 
 
80%  3 
 
20% 
 
Rajasthan  8 6 
 
80%  2 
 
20% 
 
Tamil Nadu  8 6 
 
80%  2 
 
20% 
 
Uttar Pradesh  8 4  50%  4  50% 
 
West Bengal  8 4  50%  4  50% 
 
INDIA 133  87  66% 43 34% 
 
 
 
Annexure 3: Scheduled election years & Growth of Riots: Aggregate (1958 – 2004) 
 
Item 
 
States 
 
No. of  
States 
No. of States with more Positives to Negative growth rate 
Andhra Pradesh; Gujarat; Jammu & Kashmir; Karnataka; Kerala; 
Maharashtra; Orissa; Punjab; Rajasthan; Tamil Nadu  10 
No. of States with more Negative to Positive growth rate  Bihar  1 
No. of States with even Negative and Positive growth rate  Assam; Haryana; Madhya Pradesh; Uttar Pradesh; West Bengal  5   24
Annexure 4: Election Cycle & Riots equation function   
 
 
Variables 
Model 17 
 
Log (Riots * 
BJP Govt ) 
Model 18 
 
Log (Riots * 
BJP Govt ) 
Model 19 
 
Log (Riots * 
BJP Govt ) 
Model 20 
 
Log (Riots * 
INC Govt ) 
Model 21 
 
Log (Riots * 
INC Govt ) 
Model 22 
 
Log (Riots * 
INC Govt ) 
 
 
Constant 
0.20 *** 
(0.11) 
0.21 ** 
(0.10) 
0.21 ** 
(0.10) 
-1.15 
(0.54) 
-1.07 ** 
(0.55) 
-1.15 ** 
(0.57) 
Scheduled Election year 
0.03 * 
(0.01) 
------  ------  0.17 ** 
(0.07) 
------  ------ 
Mid-term Election year 
------  0.001 
(0.00) 
------ ------  -0.03 + 
(0.02) 
------ 
1 year before Elections 
------ ------  -0.04 * 
(0.01) 
------ ------  -0.10 ** 
(0.05) 
2 years before Elections 
------  ------  -0.05 * 
(0.01) 
------  ------  -0.11 ** 
(0.05) 
3 years before Elections 
------  ------  -0.01 
(0.01) 
------  ------  -0.13 ** 
(0.06) 
4 years before Elections 
------  ------  -0.02 + 
(0.01) 
------  ------  -0.07 
(0.08) 
GDP Growth rate (t – 1) 
0.0008 + 
(0.00) 
0.001 + 
(0.00) 
0.001 + 
(0.00) 
0.0003 
(0.00) 
0.0004 
(0.00) 
0.0005 
(0.00) 
Log   
(Economic Development (t – 1) 
-0.04 *** 
(0.02) 
-0.04 *** 
(0.02) 
-0.03 *** 
(0.02) 
0.26 * 
(0.10) 
0.26 ** 
(0.10) 
0.28 * 
(0.11) 
Log (Population (t – 1)) 
0.007 
(0.01) 
0.009 
(0.01) 
0.007 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
Fractionalization (t – 1) 
0.003 
(0.00) 
0.003 
(0.00) 
0.003 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Literate Population (t – 1) 
5.17E-05 
(0.00) 
5.79E-05 
(0.00) 
5.37E-05 
(0.00) 
-0.0004 ** 
(0.00) 
-0.0004 ** 
(0.00) 
-0.0004 ** 
(0.00) 
Poverty rate (t – 1) 
0.001 *** 
(0.00) 
0.001 *** 
(0.00) 
0.001 *** 
(0.00) 
0.0008 
(0.00) 
0.0007 
(0.00) 
0.0006 
(0.00) 
Agriculture Yield (t – 1) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.02 * 
(0.00) 
-0.02 * 
(0.00) 
-0.02 * 
(0.00) 
BJP Seat Share in States 
0.03 ** 
(0.01) 
0.03 ** 
(0.01) 
0.02 *** 
(0.01) 
------  ------  ------ 
BJP government at Center 
-5.06E-05 
(0.00) 
-5.63E-05 
(0.00) 
-3.84E-05 
(0.00) 
------  ------  ------ 
Log (BJP * Riots (t – 1)) 
0.96 * 
(0.02) 
0.96 * 
(0.02) 
0.96 * 
(0.02) 
------  ------  ------ 
INC Seat Share in States 
------  ------  ------  -0.29 * 
(0.07) 
-0.30 * 
(0.07) 
-0.30 * 
(0.07) 
Log (INC * Riots (t – 1)) 
------  ------  ------  0.78 * 
(0.05) 
0.78 * 
(0.06) 
0.77 * 
(0.06) 
Time Dummy 
0.003 
(0.00) 
0.003 + 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
-0.02 ** 
(0.00) 
-0.02 ** 
(0.00) 
-0.02 ** 
(0.00) 
 
R-squared 0.970165  0.969888  0.970489  0.696115  0.692159  0.693930 
Adjusted R-squared  0.969665  0.969383  0.969868  0.691453  0.687436  0.687929   25
Log Likelihood   517.3468  513.9832  521.3292  -557.9673  -562.6826  -560.5788 
F-statistic  1940.20 *  1921.83 *  1563.16 *  149.31 *  146.56 *  115.63 * 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.144638  2.156700  2.153337  2.011802  2.015103  2.010208 
Number of States  16  16 16 16  16  16 
Total  No. of Observations  730  730 730  730  730  730 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level; *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 5% confidence level. White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard 
Errors are reported in parenthesis.  
 
 
 
Annexure 5: States under Study 
    
States 
Study  
Period States 
Study 
Period States 
Study 
Period States  Study  Period 
Andhra Pradesh 
 
1958 – 2004  Assam 
 
1958 – 2004  Bihar 
 
1958 – 2004 
 
Gujarat 
 
1958 – 2004 
Haryana 
 
1965 – 2004  Jammu & Kashmir 
 
1958 – 2004  Karnataka 
 
1958 – 2004 
 
Kerala 
 
1958 – 2004 
Madhya Pradesh 
 
1958 – 2004  Maharashtra 
 
1958 – 2004 
 
Orissa 
 
1958 – 2004 
 
Punjab 
 
1958 – 2004 
Rajasthan 
 
1958 – 2004  Tamil Nadu 
 
1958 – 2004 
 
Uttar Pradesh 
 
1958 – 2004 
 
West Bengal 
 
1958 – 2004 
 
 
 
Annexure 6: Data Sources 
 
Variables 
 
Data Source 
 
Data Link 
 
Scheduled Election Year  Election Commission of India  www.eci.gov.in/ 
Electoral Cycle Variables  Author’s own construction  Author’s own construction 
Midterm Election Cycle  Author’s own construction  Author’s own construction 
Log (Riots) 
National Crime Records Bureau, 
Government of India 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm 
Growth rate of Riots  Author’s own construction  Author’s own construction 
Growth rate of Riots  Author’s own construction  Author’s own construction 
GDP growth rate  EOPP, London School of Economics http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/eopp/_new/data/Indian_Data/default.asp 
Log (Percapita GDP)  EOPP, London School of Economics http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/eopp/_new/data/Indian_Data/default.asp 
Log (Population)  EOPP, London School of Economics http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/eopp/_new/data/Indian_Data/default.asp 
Fractionalization Index 
Center for Study for Civil War (CSCW), 
PRIO 
Urdal (2008) 
Literate Population 
Center for Study for Civil War (CSCW), 
PRIO 
Urdal (2008) 
Poverty rate  EOPP, London School of Economics http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/eopp/_new/data/Indian_Data/default.asp 
Agriculture Yield 
Center for Study for Civil War (CSCW), 
PRIO 
Urdal (2008) 
BJP Government at States  Election Commission of India  www.eci.gov.in/ 
BJP Government at Center  Election Commission of India  www.eci.gov.in/   26
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Graph 2 
 
Rate of Growth of Riots in India (26 States): 1953 - 2006
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Graph 3 
 
Coefficients on Election Cycle for Riots
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Graph 4 
 
Coefficients on Election Cycle for Intensity of Riots
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Graph 5 
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Graph 6 
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Graph 7 
 
Riots & Economic Growth Relationship R2 = 0.0005
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  Graph 7 
 
Riots & Economic Development Relationship R2 = 0.0008
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Graph 9 
 
Riots & Population Pressure Relationship R2 = 0.2884
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  Graph 10 
 
Riots & Poverty Relationship R2 = 0.0275
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